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MEAN-SET ATTACK: CRYPTANALYSIS OF SIBERT ET AL.
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
NATALIA MOSINA AND ALEXANDER USHAKOV
Abstract. We analyze the Sibert et al. group-based (Feige-Fiat-Shamir type)
authentication protocol and show that the protocol is not computationally
zero-knowledge. In addition, we provide experimental evidence that our ap-
proach is practical and can succeed even for groups with no efficiently com-
putable length function such as braid groups. The novelty of this work is that
we are not attacking the protocol by trying to solve an underlying complex al-
gebraic problem, namely, the conjugacy search problem, but use a probabilistic
approach, instead.
Key words and phrases: group-based cryptography, zero knowledge, au-
thentication protocol, probability on graphs and groups, braid group, mean-
set, mean-set attack principle, shift search problem.
1. Introduction
The group-based cryptography attracted a lot of attention after invention of
the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld [1] and Ko-Lee et al. [20] key-exchange protocols in
1999. Since then a number of new cryptographic protocols, including public-key
authentication protocols, based on infinite groups were invented and analyzed. One
may consult [25] and [11] to learn more about general group-based cryptography. In
this paper we consider a particular interactive group-based authentication scheme,
Sibert et al. protocol (see [34], [11]).
Recall that any interactive proof of knowledge system is a multi-round random-
ized protocol for two parties, in which one of the parties (the Prover) wishes to
convince another party (the Verifier) of the validity of a given assertion. Every in-
teractive proof of knowledge should satisfy completeness and soundness properties
([14], [16]):
Completeness: If the assertion is true, it should be accepted by the Verifier
with high probability.
Soundness: If the assertion is false, then the Verifier rejects it with high
probability.
If the Prover does not trust the Verifier and does not want to compromise any pri-
vate information in the process of providing the proof of identity, then the following
property, concerned with the preservation of security, becomes very important:
Zero-Knowledge (ZK): Except the validity of the Prover’s assertions, no
other information is revealed in the process of the proof.
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If a given protocol possesses the zero-knowledge property, then it is considered to
be a zero-knowledge interactive proof system ([16]).
There are three different notions of zero-knowledge that have been commonly
used in the literature ([15], [16], [11]); namely, perfect zero-knowledge, statistical
zero-knowledge, and computational zero-knowledge. The first notion is the most
strict definition of ZK, which is rarely useful in practice. The last notion of the ZK
property (computational zero-knowledge) is the most liberal notion, and it is used
more frequently in practice than the others.
Sibert et al. authentication protocol, is an example of an interactive (dynamic,
randomized) proof system. In this paper, we use probabilistic tools, introduced
in [27] and outlined in Section 2.3 below, to design an attack on this particular
cryptographic primitive and show that it is not computationally zero-knowledge.
In addition, we conduct some experiments that support our conclusions and show
that the protocol is not secure in practice.
1.1. Description of the protocol. The Sibert’s protocol is an iterated two-party
three-pass Feige-Fiat-Shamir [14] type authentication protocol. There are two
slightly different descriptions of the protocol available in [11] and [34] with two
different key generation algorithms. In [34], the protocol is introduced as Scheme
II. Here, we follow the description of the scheme from the survey [11], except for
the minor notational modifications in the conjugation. These modifications do not
affect the protocol and its cryptographic properties at all (inverting r and y in [11]
would resolve it). In addition, [11] and [34] treat the protocol slightly differently
themselves, with and without a collision-free one-way hash function, respectively.
Nevertheless, it is not essential for our analysis.
Let G be a (non-commutative, infinite) group, called the platform group and µ
a probability measure on G. The Prover’s private key is an element s ∈ G, the
Prover’s public key is a pair (w, t), where w is an arbitrary element of the group
G, called the base element, and t = s−1ws is a conjugate of w by s. In addition,
we assume that H is a collision-free one-way hash function from G to {0, 1}N . A
single round of the protocol is performed as follows:
(1) The Prover chooses a random element r ∈ G, called the nonce, according to
the probability measure µ, and sends x = H(r−1tr), called the commitment,
to the Verifier.
(2) The Verifier chooses a random bit c, called the challenge, and sends it to
the Prover.
• If c = 0, then the Prover sends y = r to the Verifier and the Verifier
checks if the equality x = H(y−1ty) is satisfied.
• If c = 1, then the Prover sends y = sr to the Verifier and the Verifier
checks if the equality x = H(y−1wy) is satisfied.
This round is repeated k times to guarantee the soundness error (i.e., probability
that a cheating Prover will be able to convince the Verifier of a false statement) of
order 2−k, which is considered to be negligible if k is large, say k ≥ 100. The Sibert’s
protocol satisfies both, completeness and soundness, properties of interactive proof
systems.
In addition, [34] describes another authentication protocol, the so-called Scheme
III, which is different from the one described above. Even though techniques of this
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paper do not directly apply to that protocol, we believe that using similar ideas,
this scheme can be successfully attacked as well.
1.2. Security of the protocol. Note that if an intruder (named Eve) can compute
the secret element s or any element s′ ∈ G such that t = s′−1ws′, i.e., if Eve can
solve the conjugacy search problem for G, then she can authenticate as the Prover.
Thus, as indicated in [34], the computational difficulty of the conjugacy search
problem for G is necessary for security of this protocol.
Originally, it was proposed to use braid groups Bn (see [2, 13, 19]) as platform
groups, because there was no efficient solution of the conjugacy search problem for
Bn known. This motivated a lot of research about braid groups. As a result of
recent developments ([3], [5], [4]), there is an opinion that the conjugacy search
problem for Bn can be solved in polynomial time. If that is true in fact, then the
Sibert et. al. authentication protocol is insecure for Bn. Nevertheless, the same
protocol can be used with other platform groups and, hence, it is important to
have tools for analysis of this type of general Sibert protocols. We show in the
present paper that it is not necessary to solve the conjugacy search problem for
G to break the scheme. Instead, one can analyze zero-knowledge property of the
protocol by employing ideas from probability theory and show that the protocol is
insecure under a mild assumption of existence of an efficiently computable length
function for the platform group G. Even for groups with no efficiently computable
length function, such as Bn, a reasonable approximation can do the job.
Now, let µ be a probability measure on a platform group G. We say that µ is
left-invariant if for every A ⊆ G and g ∈ G the equality µ(A) = µ(gA) holds. The
following result is proved in [34].
Proposition ([34]). Let G be a group. If the conjugacy search problem for G is
computationally hard (cannot be solved by a probabilistic polynomial time Turing
machine) and µ is a left-invariant probability measure on G then the outlined above
protocol is a zero knowledge interactive proof system.
Clearly, there are no left-invariant probability measures on braid groups, used
as platform groups in the protocol, and, therefore, as noticed in [11] and [34], this
protocol cannot be a perfect zero knowledge interactive proof system when used
with an infinite group such as Bn. Nevertheless, it is conjectured in [34] that the
scheme can be computationally zero knowledge for certain distributions µ on Bn.
The authors supported that conjecture by statistical arguments based on length
analysis.
1.3. The idea of mean-set attack: the shift search problem. If we look at
the protocol outlined in Section 1.1, we observe that the Prover sends to the Verifier
a sequence of random elements of two types: r and sr, where r is a randomly gener-
ated element and s is the Prover’s secret element. Any passive eavesdropper (Eve)
can arrange a table of challenge/response transactions, where each row corresponds
to a single round of the protocol, as shown below,
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Round Challenge Response type #
1
Response type #
2
1 c = 1 – sr1
2 c = 0 r2 –
3 c = 0 r3 –
4 c = 1 – sr4
5 c = 0 r5 –
. . . . . . . . . . . .
n c = 0 rn –
and obtain two sets of elements, corresponding to c = 0 and c = 1 respectively:
R0 = {ri1 , . . . , rik} and R1 = {srj1 , . . . , srjn−k}, where all elements ri are dis-
tributed according to µ, i.e., all these elements are generated by the same random
generator. Eve’s goal is to recover the secret element s based on the intercepted
sequences R0 and R1. We call this problem a shift search problem.
To explain the idea of the mean-set attack, assume for a moment that the group
G is an infinite cyclic group Z. In that case, we can rewrite the elements of R1
in additive notation {s + rj1 , . . . , s + rjn−k}. Then we can compute the empirical
average r0 =
1
k
∑k
m=1 rim of the elements in R0 ⊂ Z and the empirical average
r1 =
1
n−k
∑n−k
l=1 (s + rjl) = s +
1
n−k
∑n−k
l=1 rjl of the elements in R1 ⊂ Z. By the
strong law of large numbers for real-valued random variables the larger the sequence
R0 is, the closer the value of r0 to the actual mean E(µ) of the distribution µ on Z,
induced by r. Similarly, the larger the sequence R1 is, the closer the value of r1 is
to the number s+E(µ). Therefore, subtracting r0 from r1, we obtain a good guess
of what s is. Observe three crucial properties that allow us to compute the secret
element in the case G = Z:
(AV1) (Strong law of large numbers for real-valued random variables) If {ξi}∞i=1
is a sequence of independent and identically distribute (i.i.d.) real-valued
random variables, then
1
n
n∑
i=1
ξi→Eξ1
with probability one as n→∞, provided E(ξ1) <∞.
(AV2) (”Shift“ property or linearity) For any real-valued random variable ξ, the
formula
E(c+ ξ) = c+ E(ξ)
holds.
(AV3) (Efficient computations) The average value 1n
∑n
i=1 ξi is efficiently com-
putable.
Geometrically, we can interpret this approach as follows. Given a large sample
of random, independent, and identically distributed points ri1 , . . . , rik and a large
sample of shifted points s+rj1 , . . . , s+rjn−k on the real line, the shift s is “effectively
visible”.
It turns out that the same is true in general infinite groups. One can generalize
a number of mathematical tools of the classical probability theory to finitely gen-
erated groups (see [27] and Section 2.3 below) in order to have the counterparts of
(AV1), (AV2), and (AV3). Indeed,
• for a random group element ξ : Ω → G, one can define a set E(ξ) ⊆ G
called the mean-set,
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• for a sample of n random group elements ξ1, . . . , ξn, one can define their
average – a set Sn = S(ξ1, . . . , ξn) ⊆ G called the sample mean-set of
elements ξ1, . . . , ξn,
so that we have a ”shift“ property E(sξ) = sE(ξ) and a generalization of the
strong law of large numbers (SLLN) for groups with respect to E(ξ) in a sense
that S(ξ1, . . . , ξn) converges to E(ξ1) as n → ∞ with probability one (see Section
2.3 for precise definitions and statements). In addition, assume that sample mean
S(ξ1, . . . , ξn) is efficiently computable. Using the operator S, Eve can compute a
set
S(srj1 , . . . , srjn−k) · [S(ri1 , . . . , rik)]
−1,
which should contain s with high probability when n is sufficiently large. This
is the idea of the mean-set attack and our approach to the shift search problem.
Furthermore, one can show that the more rounds of the protocol are performed,
the more information about the secret key our attack gains (note that at the same
time the protocol is iterated by its nature, and large number of rounds is important
for its reliability in a sense of the soundness property). The discussion above leads
to the main theoretical results of this paper, proved in Section 4.
Theorem A. (Mean-set attack principle – I) Let G be a group, X a finite
generating set for G, s ∈ G a secret fixed element, and ξ1, ξ2, . . . a sequence of
randomly generated i.i.d. group elements, such that Eξ1 = {g}. If ξ1, . . . , ξn is a
sample of random elements of G generated by the Prover, c1, . . . , cn a succession of
random bits (challenges) generated by the Verifier, and
yi =
{
ri if ci = 0;
sri if ci = 1
random elements representing responses of the Prover, then there exists a constant
D = D(G,µ) such that
P
(
s 6∈ S
(
{yi | ci = 1, i = 1, . . . , n}
)
· S
(
{yi | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}
)−1)
≤
D
n
.
Theorem B. (Mean-set attack principle – II) If, in addition to the assump-
tions of Theorem A, the distribution µ has finite support, then there exists a constant
D = D(G,µ) such that
P
(
s 6∈ S
(
{yi | ci = 1, i = 1, . . . , n}
)
· S
(
{yi | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}
)−1)
≤ O(e−Dn).
1.4. Outline. Section 2 reviews some necessary graph- and group-theoretic pre-
liminaries that constitute the setting of our work. In Section 2.3, we recall the
notion of the mean-set (expectation) of a (graph-)group-valued random element,
introduced in [27], and main theorems relevant to this object to prepare the ground
for the main results; in particular, we discuss the ”shift“ property, the strong law
of large numbers, and the analogues of Chebyshev and Chernoff-like inequalities
for graphs and groups. In Section 3, we propose an algorithm for computing mean-
sets. Next, we turn to formulations and proofs of the main theoretical results of
this paper, the mean-set attack principles under different assumptions. This task
is carried out in Section 4. At the end of that section, we indicate that even if
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the proposed algorithm fails, we can still gain some information about the secret
key of the Prover. In other words, the more rounds of the protocol are performed,
the more information about the secret key we can gain. In Section 5.1, we present
results of our experiments with the classical key generation according to [11]. Sec-
tion 5.2 is concerned with results of experiments with the alternative (special) key
generation proposed by Sibert et al. in [34]. At the end, in Section 6, we discuss
possible methods for defending against the mean-set attack.
2. Preliminaries
Let us briefly recall some definitions of group and graph theory. For a better
insight into graph theory, the reader is referred to [35], while [21] can serve as a
good introduction into group theory.
2.1. Graphs. An undirected graph Γ is an ordered pair of sets (V,E) where
• V = V (Γ) is called the vertex set;
• E = E(Γ) is a set of unordered pairs (v1, v2) ∈ V × V called the edge set.
If e = (v1, v2) ∈ E then we say that v1 and v2 are adjacent in Γ. The number
of vertices adjacent to v is called the degree of v. We say that the graph Γ is
locally-finite if every vertex has a finite degree.
A directed graph Γ is an ordered pair of sets (V,E) where E = E(Γ) is a set of
ordered pairs (v1, v2) ∈ V ×V . If e = (v1, v2) ∈ E, then we say that v1 is the origin
of the edge e, denoted by o(e), and v2 is the terminus of e, denoted by t(e). An
undirected graph can be viewed as a directed graph in which a pair (v1, v2) ∈ E
serves as two edges (v1, v2) and (v2, v1).
A path p in a directed graph Γ is a finite sequence of edges e1, . . . , en such that
t(ei) = o(ei+1). The vertex o(e1) is called the origin of the path p and is denoted
by o(p). The vertex t(en) is called the terminus of the path p and is denoted by
t(p). The number n is called the length of the path p and is denoted by |p|. We say
that two vertices v1, v2 ∈ V (Γ) are connected, if there exists a path from v1 to v2
in Γ. The graph Γ is connected if every pair of vertices is connected.
The distance between v1 and v2 in a graph Γ is the length d(v1, v2) of a shortest
path between v1 and v2. If v1 and v2 are disconnected, then d(v1, v2) =∞. We say
that a path p = e1, . . . , en from v1 to v2 is geodesic in a graph Γ if d(o(p), t(p)) =
d(v1, v2) = n, i.e., if p is a shortest path from v1 to v2.
A path p = e1, . . . , en in a graph Γ is closed, if o(p) = t(p). In this case we say
that p is a cycle in Γ. A path p is simple, if no proper segment of p is a cycle. The
graph Γ is a tree if it does not contain a simple cycle.
2.2. Groups and Cayley graphs. Consider a finite set, also called alphabet, X =
{x1, . . . , xn}, and let X−1 be the set of formal inverses {x
−1
1 , . . . , x
−1
n } of elements
in X . This defines an involution −1 on the set X±1 := X ∪X−1 which maps every
symbol x ∈ X to its formal inverse x−1 ∈ X−1 and every symbol x−1 ∈ X−1 to
the original x ∈ X . An alphabet X is called a group alphabet if X−1 ⊆ X , and
there is an involution which maps elements of X to their inverses. An X-digraph
is a graph (V,E) with edges labeled by elements in X±1 = X ∪X−1 such that for
any edge e = u
x
→ v there exists an edge v
x−1
→ u, which is called the inverse of e
and is denoted by e−1. See [18] for more information on X-digraphs.
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Let G be a group and X ⊂ G a set of generators for G, i.e. G = 〈X〉. Assume
that X is closed under inversion, i.e., X = X±1. The Cayley graph CG(X) of G
relative to X is a labeled graph (V,E), where the vertex set is V = G, and the
edge set E contains all edges of the form g1
x
→ g2 where g1, g2 ∈ G, x ∈ X and
g2 = g1x and only them. The distance between elements g1, g2 ∈ G relative to the
generating set X is the distance in the graph CG(X) between vertices g1 and g2 or,
equivalently,
dX(g1, g2) = min{n | g1x
ε1
1 x
ε2
2 . . . x
εn
n = g2 for some xi ∈ X, εi = ±1}.
2.3. Random (graph-)group elements. In this section, we recall some of the
main notions and results of [27] that are employed further in the present paper. Let
Γ = (V,E) be a locally-finite connected graph and (Ω,F , P ) a probability space.
A measurable mapping ξ : Ω → V (Γ) is called a random graph element defined on
a given probability space. A random Γ-element ξ induces an atomic probability
measure µ on V (Γ) defined in a usual way as
µ(v) = µξ(v) = P{ω | ξ(ω) = v}, v ∈ V (Γ).
Define a weight function Mξ : V (Γ)→ R by
M(v) =Mξ(v) =
∑
s∈V (Γ)
d2(v, s)µξ(s),
where d(v, s) is the distance between v and s in Γ. The domain of M is the set
domain(M) = {v ∈ V (Γ) |
∑
s∈V (Γ)
d2(v, s)µξ(s) <∞}.
It is proved in [27] that for any distribution µ on V (Γ) either domain(M) = ∅ or
domain(M) = V (Γ). In the case when domain(M) = V (Γ), we say that M(·) is
totally defined. Given that domain(M) = V (Γ), the mean-set of a Γ-valued ξ is
defined to be a set of vertices minimizing the weight function, i.e.,
(1) E(ξ) = {v ∈ V (Γ) |M(v) ≤M(u), ∀u ∈ V (Γ)}.
Sometimes we write E(µ) and speak of the mean-set of distribution µ. Using the
Cayley graph construction one can similarly define a notion of the mean-set for a
finitely generated group G (relative to a fixed generating set). Similar mean values
(in different settings) are used rather often; see [27] for some history and literature
sources. Below, we recall some results proved in [27].
Lemma 2.1 ([27]). Let ξ be a random Γ-element, where Γ is a connected locally-
finite graph, with totally defined weight function Mξ(·). Then the mean-set E(ξ) is
non-empty and finite.
The next property is an analogue of the property E(c+ξ) = c+Eξ for real-valued
random variables.
Proposition 2.2 (Shift property, [27]). Let G = 〈X〉 be a finitely generated group
and g ∈ G. Let ξ be a random G-element. Then for a random element ξg defined
by ξg(ω) := gξ(ω) we have E(ξg) = gE(ξ).
It is easy to see that this property follows from the fact that for any g1, g2, s ∈ G the
equality dX(g1, g2) = dX(sg1, sg2) holds, where dX(g1, g2) is the distance between
elements g1, g2 ∈ G relative to X (see Section 2).
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Now let ξ1, . . . , ξn be a sample of independent and identically distributed graph-
valued random elements ξi : Ω → V (Γ) defined on a given probability space
(Ω,F ,P) and µn(v) be the relative frequency
µn(v) = µn(v, ω) =
|{i | ξi(ω) = v, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}|
n
with which the value v ∈ V (Γ) occurs in the random sample ξ1(ω), . . . , ξn(ω). Let
Mn(v) =
∑
i∈V (Γ)
d2(v, i)µn(i)
be the random weight, called the sampling weight, corresponding to v ∈ V (Γ), and
Mn(·) the resulting random sampling weight function. The set of vertices
Sn = S(ξ1, . . . , ξn) = {v ∈ V (Γ) |Mn(v) ≤Mn(u), ∀u ∈ V (Γ)}
is called the sample mean-set (or sample center-set) relative to ξ. The next theorem
shows that the sets Sn and E(ξ) in Γ play roles analogous to the classical average
of real values x1+...+xnn and the classical expectation E of a real-valued random
variable respectively, in the non-commutative case. In other words, the strong
law of large numbers generalized to graphs and groups states that our (empirical)
sample mean-set Sn converges to the (theoretical) mean-set E(ξ) as n→∞.
Theorem 2.3 (Strong law of large numbers, [27]). Let Γ be a locally-finite con-
nected graph and {ξi}∞i=1 a sequence of i.i.d. random Γ-elements. If the weight
function Mξ1(·) is totally defined and E(ξ1) = {v} for some v ∈ V (Γ), then
lim
n→∞
Sn = E(ξ1)
with probability one.
Similar result holds for multi-vertex mean-sets. See [27] for technical conditions
needed, as well as other details. The simplest version of multi-vertex SLLN in terms
of limsup is as follows:
Theorem 2.4 (Multi-Vertex SLLN, [27]). Let Γ be a locally-finite connected graph
and {ξi}∞i=1 be a sequence of i.i.d. random Γ-elements. Assume that the weight
function Mξ1(·) is totally defined and E(ξ) = {v1, . . . , vk}, where k ≥ 4. If E(ξ1) ⊆
supp(µ) then
lim sup
n→∞
Sn = E(ξ1)
holds with probability one.
Moreover, the following asymptotic upper bounds (analogues of the classical
Chebyshev and Chernoff bounds) on convergence rate hold:
Theorem 2.5 (Chebyshev’s inequality for graphs, [27]). Let Γ be a locally-finite
connected graph and {ξi}
∞
i=1 a sequence of i.i.d. random Γ-elements. If the weight
function Mξ1(·) is totally defined then there exists a constant C = C(Γ, ξ1) > 0
such that
(2) P(S(ξ1, . . . , ξn) 6⊆ E(ξ1)) ≤
C
n
.
With an additional assumption on µ, we can get even Chernoff-like asymptotic
bound.
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Theorem 2.6 (Chernoff-like bound for graphs, [27]). Let Γ be a locally-finite con-
nected graph and {ξi}∞i=1 a sequence of i.i.d. random Γ-elements. If the weight
function Mξ1(·) is totally defined and µξ1 has finite support, then for some constant
C > 0
(3) P
(
S(ξ1, . . . , ξn) 6⊆ E(ξ1)
)
≤ O(e−Cn).
3. Effective computation of a mean-set
Let G be a group and {ξi}ni=1 a sequence of random i.i.d. elements taking values
in G such that the corresponding weight functionM(·) is totally defined. In Section
2.3, we introduced a notion of the mean-set of ξ that satisfies the desirable properties
(AV1) and (AV2) of Section 1.3. One of the technical difficulties encountered in
practice is that, unlike the classical average value (x1 + . . .+ xn)/n for real-valued
random variables, the sample mean-set Sn is hard to compute. In other words, in
general, our definition of the meat-set might not satisfy the property (AV3).
Several problems arise when trying to compute Sn:
• Straightforward computation of the set {M(g) | g ∈ G} requires at least
O(|G|2) steps. This is computationally infeasible for large groups G, and
impossible for infinite groups. Hence we might want to reduce the search
of a minimum to some small part of G.
• There exist infinite groups in which the distance function d(·, ·) is very
difficult to compute. The braid group B∞ is an example for such a group.
The computation of the distance function for B∞ is known to be NP-hard,
see [31]. Such groups require special treatment.
Moreover, there exist infinite groups for which the distance function d(·, ·)
is not computable. We omit consideration of such groups.
We devise a heuristic procedure to solve the first problem. As proved in [27],
if the weight function M(·) satisfies certain local monotonicity properties, then
our procedure achieves the desired result. Our algorithm is a simple direct descent
heuristic, in which we use the sample weight functionMn that comes from a sample
of random group elements {g1, . . . , gn} from a finitely-generated group G.
Algorithm 3.1 (Direct Descent Heuristic).
Input: A group G with a finite set of generatorsX ⊆ G and a sequence of elements
{g1, . . . , gn} in G.
Output: An element g ∈ G that locally minimizes Mn(·).
Computations:
A. Choose a random g ∈ G according to some probability measure ν on G.
B. If for every x ∈ X±1, Mn(g) ≤Mn(gx), then output g.
C. Otherwise put g ← gx, where x ∈ X±1 is an element minimizing the value
of Mn(gx) and go to step B.
As any other direct descend heuristic method, Algorithm 3.1 might not work if
the function Mn has local minima. It is proved in [27] that it always works for trees
and, hence, for free groups.
Theorem 3.2 ([27]). Let µ be a distribution on a locally-finite tree T such that
a function M is totally defined. Then Algorithm 3.1 for T and M finds a central
point (mean-set) of µ on T .
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The second problem of computing Sn concerns practical computations of length
function in G. It turns out that we need a relatively mild assumption to deal
with it – the existence of an efficiently computable distance function dX(·, ·); even
a “reasonable” approximation of the length function may work. In this work we
approximate geodesic length using the method described in [23]. Even though it
does not guarantee the optimal result, it was proved to be practically useful in a
series of attacks, see [24, 30, 29, 22].
4. The mean-set attack
In this section, we use theoretical results stated above to attack the Sibert et
al. protocol, described in Section 1.1. In the following heuristic attack we use the
Algorithm 3.1 to compute sample mean-set Sn.
Algorithm 4.1. (The mean-set attack)
Input: The Prover’s public element (t, w) and sequences R0 and R1 as in the
protocol.
Output: An element z satisfying the equality t = z−1wz (which can be considered
as the Prover’s private key), or Failure.
Computations:
A. Apply Algorithm 3.1 to R0 and obtain g0.
B. Apply Algorithm 3.1 to R1 and obtain g1.
C. If g1g
−1
0 satisfies t = (g1g
−1
0 )
−1w(g1g
−1
0 ) then output g1g
−1
0 . Otherwise
output Failure.
If the algorithm outputs an element z ∈ G, then z can serve as the Prover’s
original secret s; any solution of the conjugacy equation t = x−1wx does. In
general, z can be different from s, and there are no means for the adversary to
determine whether z = s. In spite of that, Eve, who is only trying to authenticate
as the Prover, considers this z a success. On the other hand, since our goal is
to show that the protocol is not computationally zero-knowledge, we estimate the
probability to find s. Only this original secret element s is considered as a success
in our analysis. Other outcomes that work for Eve (when z 6= s) are ignored.
The theorems below give asymptotic bounds on the failure rate (for the original
s) in the mean-set attack. We show that the probability of the failure can decrease
linearly or exponentially, depending on the distribution µ.
Theorem 4.2 (Mean-set attack principle – I). Let G be a group, X a finite gener-
ating set for G, s ∈ G a secret fixed element, and ξ1, ξ2, . . . a sequence of randomly
generated i.i.d. group elements, such that E(ξ1) = {g}. If ξ1, . . . , ξn is a sample of
random elements of G generated by the Prover, c1, . . . , cn a succession of random
bits (challenges) generated by the Verifier, and
yi =
{
ri if ci = 0;
sri if ci = 1
random elements representing responses of the Prover, then there exists a constant
D such that
P
(
s 6∈ S
(
{yi | ci = 1, i = 1, . . . , n}
)
· S
(
{yi | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}
)−1)
≤
D
n
.
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Proof. It follows from Theorem 2.5 that there exists a constant C such that
P(S({yi | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}) 6= {g}) ≤
C
|{i | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}|
.
Applying Chebyshev’s inequality to Bernoulli random variables {ci} having E(ci) =
1
2 and σ
2
ci =
1
4 , we obtain
P
(
|{i | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}| <
n
4
)
<
4
n
.
In more detail, if number of zeros in our sample of challenges is less than n4 , then
the number of ones is greater or equal to 3n4 , and we have
P
(∣∣∣{i | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}∣∣∣ < n
4
)
< P
(∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
ci −
n
2
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ n4
)
.
Note that ∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
ci −
n
2
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ n4 ⇔
∣∣∣∣
∑n
i=1 ci
n
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 14
and
P
(∣∣∣∣
∑n
i=1 ci
n
−
1
2
∣∣∣∣ ≥ 14
)
≤
4
n
from the classical Chebyshev inequality for sample means with ε = 14 .
It follows that
P(S({yi | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}) 6= {g}) ≤
4
n
+
4C
n
≤
4 + 4C
n
.
Similarly, we prove that P(S({yi | ci = 1, i = 1, . . . , n}) 6= {sg}) ≤
4+4C
n . Hence,
P(s 6∈ S({yi | ci = 1, i = 1, . . . , n}) · S({yi | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n})
−1) ≤
8 + 8C
n
.

Furthermore, we can get Chernoff-like asymptotic bound if we impose one restric-
tion on distribution µ. Recall the original Hoeffding’s inequality ([17]) well-known
in probability theory. Assume that {xi} is a sequence of independent random vari-
ables and that every xi is almost surely bounded, i.e., P(xi−Exi ∈ [ai, bi]) = 1 for
some ai, bi ∈ R. Then for the sum Sn = x1 + . . .+ xn, the inequality
P(Sn − ESn ≥ nε) ≤ exp
(
−
2n2ε2∑n
i=1(bi − ai)
2
)
holds. If xi are identically distributed, then we get the inequality
(4) P
(
1
n
(x1 + . . .+ xn)− Ex1 ≥ ε
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−
2ε2
(b− a)2
n
)
.
Now we can prove the Mean-set attack principle with exponential bounds.
Theorem 4.3 (Mean-set attack principle – II). Let G be a group, X a finite
generating set for G, s ∈ G a secret fixed element, and ξ1, ξ2, . . . a sequence of
randomly generated i.i.d. group elements, such that E(ξ1) = {g}. If ξ1, . . . , ξn is a
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sample of random elements of G generated by the Prover, c1, . . . , cn a succession of
random bits (challenges) generated by the Verifier,
yi =
{
ri if ci = 0;
sri if ci = 1
random elements representing responses of the Prover, and the distribution µ has
finite support, then there exists a constant D = D(G,µ) such that
P
(
s 6∈ S
(
{yi | ci = 1, i = 1, . . . , n}
)
· S
(
{yi | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}
)−1)
≤ O(e−Dn).
Proof. It follows from Theorem 2.6 that there exists a constant C such that
P(S({yi | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}) 6= {g}) ≤ O(e
−C|{i|ci=0,i=1,...,n}|).
Applying inequality (4) to Bernoulli random variables {ci}, we get
P
(
n∑
i=1
ci −
1
2
>
1
4
)
< e−n/8.
Thus, we obtain a bound
P(S({yi | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n}) 6= {g}) ≤ e
−n/8 +O(e−Cn/4).
Similarly, we prove that P(S({yi | ci = 1, i = 1, . . . , n}) 6= {sg}) ≤ e−n/8 +
O(e−Cn/4). Hence,
P(s 6∈ S({yi | ci = 1, i = 1, . . . , n}) · S({yi | ci = 0, i = 1, . . . , n})
−1) ≤ O(e−Dn)
where D = min{1/8, C/4}. 
Algorithm 4.1 can fail. Nevertheless the pair of the obtained elements g0, g1
often encodes some additional information about the secret s. Indeed, assume that
Eµ = {g}. The element g0 obtained at step A of Algorithm 4.1 can be viewed as a
product ge0 for some e0 ∈ G. Similarly, the element g1 can be viewed as a product
sge1 for some e1 ∈ G. Hence Algorithm 4.1 outputs the secret element s whenever
g1g
−1
0 = sge1e
−1
0 g
−1 = s, i.e., whenever e1e
−1
0 = 1.
Now, assume that Algorithm 4.1 has failed, i.e., e1e
−1
0 6= 1. In this case, one can
try to reconstruct the secret element s as a product
g1 · e · g
−1
0 = sge1 · e · e
−1
0 g
−1
where e is an unknown element of the platform group. Clearly, e gives a correct
answer if and only if e1 · e · e
−1
0 = 1 or e = e
−1
1 e0. The element
(5) e−11 e0
is called the error of the method. Clearly, one only needs to enumerate all words e
of length up to |e−11 e0| to reconstruct the required s in the form g1eg
−1
0 . If a secret
element s is chosen uniformly as a word of length l and |e−11 e0| < l, then we gain
some information about s, since the search space for s reduces. We can improve
Algorithm 4.1 by adding such enumeration step as follows.
Algorithm 4.4. (The attack–2)
Input: The Prover’s public element (t, w). Sequences R0 and R1 as in the protocol.
The number k ∈ N – the expected length of error element e1e
−1
0 .
Output: An element z satisfying the equality t = z−1wz (which can be considered
MEAN-SET ATTACK 13
as the Prover’s private key), or Failure.
Computations:
A. Apply Algorithm 3.1 to R0 and obtain g0.
B. Apply Algorithm 3.1 to R1 and obtain g1.
C. For every word e of lengths up to k, check if g1eg
−1
0 satisfies the equality t =
(g1eg
−1
0 )
−1w(g1eg
−1
0 ) and if so output g1eg
−1
0 . Otherwise output Failure.
5. Experiments
To demonstrate the practical use of our mean-set attack, we perform a series
of experiments, which we describe below. In [34], [11] two different methods of
generation of nonce elements were proposed, both with the same platform group
Bn, which has the following (Artin’s) presentation
Bn =
〈
σ1, . . . , σn−1
∣∣∣∣ σiσjσi = σjσiσj if |i− j| = 1σiσj = σjσi if |i− j| > 1
〉
.
We distinguish between the two ways, classical ([11]) and alternative ([34]), to
generate elements of the underlying group by performing two different sets of ex-
periments outlined below in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. In both cases, we observe that
the secret information of the Prover is not secure, and the probability to break the
protocol grows as the number of rounds of the protocol increases. All experiments
are done using the CRAG software package [9].
5.1. Classical key generation. Classical key generation of the elements of Bn
was suggested in [11] with parameters n = 50 (rank of the braid group) and the
lengths of private keys L = 512. The length function relative to the Artin generators
{σ1, . . . , σn−1} is NP -hard. That is why in this paper, as it was already mentioned
in Section 3, we use the approximation of geodesic length method, proposed in [24].
See [24, 30, 29, 22] for a series of successful attacks using this method. We want
to emphasize that we compute the sampling weight values in the Algorithm 3.1,
which is a subroutine in Algorithm 4.1, using the approximated distance function
values in Bn.
One of the disadvantages of the approximation algorithm that we used is that
there is no polynomial time upper bound for that as it uses Dehornoy handle-free
forms [10]. As a result we do not know the complexity of our algorithm and we do
not know how our algorithm scales with parameter values. In each experiment we
randomly generate an instance of the authentication protocol and try to break it,
i.e., find the private key, using the techniques developed in this paper. Recall that
each authentication is a series of k 3-pass commitment-challenge-response rounds.
Therefore, an instance of authentication consists of k triples (xi, ci, ri), i = 1, . . . , k
obtained as described in Section 1.1. Here xi is a commitment, ci is a challenge,
and ri is a response. A random bit ci is chosen randomly and uniformly from the
set {0, 1}. In our experiments we make an assumption that exactly half of ci’s are
0 and half are 1. This allows us to see an instance of the protocol as a pair of
equinumerous sets R0 = {r1, . . . , rk/2} ⊂ Bn and R1 = {sr
′
1, . . . , sr
′
k/2} ⊂ Bn.
The main parameters for the system are the rank n of the braid group, the
number of rounds k in the protocol, and the length L of secret keys. We generate
a single instance of the problem with parameters (n, k, L) as follows:
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• A braid s is chosen randomly and uniformly as a word of length L over a
group alphabet {σ1, . . . , σn−1}. This braid is a secret element which is used
only to generate further data and to compare the final element to.
• A sequence R0 = {r1, . . . , rk/2} of braid words chosen randomly and uni-
formly as words of length L over a group alphabet {σ1, . . . , σn−1}.
• A sequence R1 = {sr′1, . . . , sr
′
k/2} of braid words, where r
′
i are chosen ran-
domly and uniformly as words of length L over a group alphabet {σ1, . . . , σn−1}.
For every parameter set (n, k, L) we generate 1000 random instances (R0, R1) and
run Algorithm 4.1 which attempts to find the secret key s used in the generation
of R1.
Below we present the results of actual experiments done for groups B5, B10,
and B20. Horizontally we have increasing number of rounds k from 10 to 320 and
vertically we have increasing lengths L from 10 to 100. Every cell contains a pair
(P%, E) where P is a success rate and E is an average length of the error (5) of the
method for the corresponding pair (L, k) of parameter values. All experiments were
performed using CRAG library [9]. The library provides an environment to test
cryptographic protocols constructed from non-commutative groups, for example the
braid group.
L\k 10 20 40 80 160 320
10 (19%, 1.3) (72%, 0.3) (97%, 0.04) (100%, 0) (100%, 0) (100%, 0)
50 (2%, 13.4) (8%, 9) (68%, 1.3) (93%,0.1) (100%, 0) (100%, 0)
100 (0%, 53.7) (0%, 48.1) (6%, 26.9) (44%, 14) (65%, 14.7) (87%, 5)
Table 1. Experiments in B5.
L\k 10 20 40 80 160 320
10 (15%, 1.8) (68%, 0.3) (98%, 0) (100%, 0) (100%, 0) (100%, 0)
50 (0%, 4.5) (23%, 1.3) (82%, 0) (97%, 0) (99%, 0) (100%, 0)
100 (1%, 41) (7% ,23.5) (33%,5) (79%, 1) (97%, 0.6) (98%, 1.1)
Table 2. Experiments in B10.
L\k 10 20 40 80 160 320
10 (15%, 1.6) (87%, 0.1) (100%, 0) (100%, 0) (100%, 0) (100%, 0)
50 (0%, 5.4) (23%, 1.7) (81%, 0.2) (100%, 0) (100%, 0) (100%, 0)
100 (0%,7.8) (15%, 2) (72%, 0.3) (97%, 0) (100%, 0) (100%, 0)
Table 3. Experiments in B20.
We immediately observe from the data above that:
• the success rate increases as the number of rounds (sample size) increases;
• the success rate decreases as the length of the key increases;
• the success rate increases as the rank of the group increases;
• the average error length decreases as we increase the number of rounds.
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The first observation is the most interesting since the number of rounds is one of the
main reliability parameters of the protocol, namely, the soundness error decreases
as 1/2k as the number of rounds k gets larger. But, at the same time, we observe
that security of the scheme decreases as k increases. The second observation can be
interpreted as follows – the longer the braids are the more difficult it is to compute
the approximation. The third observation is easy to explain. The bigger the rank
of the group the more braid generators commute and the simpler random braids
are.
5.2. Alternative key generation. As we have mentioned in Section 1.2, the Sib-
ert et al. scheme, proposed in [34], does not possess perfect zero knowledge property.
Nevertheless, the authors of [34] try to achieve computational zero knowledge by
proposing a special way of generating public and private information. They provide
some statistical evidence that the scheme can be computationally zero knowledge
if this alternative key generation is used. In this section we, firstly, outline the pro-
posed key generation method and, secondly, present actual experiments supporting
our theoretical results even for this special key generation method.
The method of generating of braids in [34] can be translated to the notation of
the present paper as follows. The Prover generates
• nonce elements r as products of L uniformly chosen permutation braids pi
(see [13]) from Bn
r = p1 . . . pL,
in particular, r belongs to the corresponding positive monoid.
• the secret key s as the inverse of a product of L uniformly chosen permu-
tation braids from Bn, i.e.,
s = p−11 . . . p
−1
L .
We made a very useful observation when doing the experiments with so generated
nonce elements r. We observed that the mean-set in this case is often a singleton set
of the form {∆k}, where ∆ is a half-twist braid and k ∈ N. Therefore, to enhance
the performance of Algorithm 3.1 in step B, we test not only generators x ∈ X±1,
but also x = ∆, and if (in step C) ∆ minimizes the value of Mn(gx), then we put
x→ x∆ and return to step B.
In fact it is an interesting question if the uniform distribution on a sphere in a
Garside monoid G+ has a singleton mean set {∆kG+} for some k ∈ N, where ∆G+
is the Garside element, ∆, in G+? This is clearly true for free abelian monoids.
As we mention above, experiments show that the same can be true in the braid
monoid.
Below we present the results of actual experiments done for the group B10.
Horizontally we have increasing number of rounds k from 10 to 320 and vertically
we have increasing lengths L (in permutation braids) from 3 to 10. Every cell
contains a pair (P%, E) where P is a success rate and E is the average length of
the error for the corresponding pair (L, k) of parameter values.
Since the average Artin length (denoted L′ in the tables below) of a permutation
braid on n strands is of order n2, the length of nonce elements grows very fast with
L; it is shown in the leftmost column of the tables in parentheses. For instance, we
can see that for B10 the average length of a product of L = 3 permutation braids
is 81, the average length of a product of L = 5 permutation braids is 138, etc.
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L(L’)\k 10 20 40 80 160 320
3 (81) (0%, 24.6) (0%, 22.5) (1%, 19.6) (4%, 16) (7%, 13.1) (25%, 12.3)
5 (138) (0%, 46.7) (0%, 40.9) (0%, 32.5) (2%, 23.3) (10%, 17.6) (28%, 14.2)
10 (274) (0%, 110.2) (0%, 102.6) (0%, 103.5) (0%, 96.3) (0%, 92.7) (0%, 87.9)
Table 4. Success rate and average length of the error for experi-
ments in B10.
Again, we observe that success rate increases as we increase the number of
rounds, and the average error length decreases as we increase the number of rounds.
6. Defending against the attack
In this section, we describe several principles one can follow in order to defend
against the mean-set attack presented in this paper or, at least, to make it computa-
tionally infeasible. Defending can be done through a special choice of the platform
group G or a special choice of a distribution µ on G. Another purpose of this
section is to motivate further study of distributions on groups and computational
properties of groups.
6.1. Groups with no efficiently computable length functions. One of the
main tools in our technique is an efficiently computable function dX(·, ·) on G.
To prevent the attacker from computing mean-sets, one can use a platform group
G with a hardly computable length function dX(·, ·) relative to any “reasonable”
finite generating set X . By reasonable generating set we mean a set, which is
small relative to the main security parameter. Examples of such groups exist.
For instance, length function for any finitely presented group with unsolvable word
problem is not computable. On the other hand, it is hard to work with such groups,
as they do not have efficiently computable normal forms.
A more interesting example is a multiplicative group of a prime field Z∗p. The
group Z∗p is cyclic, i.e., Z
∗
p = 〈a〉 for some primitive root a of p. It is easy to see
that the length of an element b ∈ Z∗p satisfies
|b| =
{
loga b if loga b ≤ (p− 1)/2,
p− 1− loga b otherwirse,
and hence the problem of computing the length of an element and the discrete
logarithm problem are computationally equivalent. The discrete logarithm problem
is widely believed to be computationally hard and is used as a basis of security of
many cryptographic protocols, most notably the ElGamal [12] and Cramer-Shoup
[8] cryptosystems. In other words, Z∗p is another example of a group with hardly
computable length function.
6.2. Systems of probability measures. Let G be a platform group. Recall that
our assumption was that the Prover uses a fixed distribution on the set of nonce
elements, i.e., every element ri is generated using the same random generator.
Instead he can use a sequence of probability measures {µi}∞i=1, where each measure
µi, i = 1, 2, . . ., is not used more than once (ever), i.e., every nonce ri, i = 1, 2, . . .,
is generated using a unique distribution {µi}. In this case, the attacker does not
have theoretical grounds for working with sampling mean-sets. Nevertheless, it
can turn out that the sequence of random elements r1, r2, . . . can have some other
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distribution µ∗ and the attack will work. Another difficulty with implementing this
idea is that there is no systematic study of distributions on general finitely generated
groups and, in particular, braid groups. So, it is hard to propose some particular
sequence of probability distributions. Some aspects of defining probability measures
on infinite groups are discussed in [6] and [7].
6.3. Undefined mean-set. Another way to foil the attack is to use a distribution
µ on G such that E(µ) is not defined, i.e., the corresponding weight function is not
totally defined. In that case the assumption of Theorem 4.2 fails, and it is easy to
see that the sampling weightsMn(g) tend to∞ with probability 1. Nevertheless, we
still can compare the sampling weight values, as explained in [26] and [28], where it
is shown that the condition of finiteness of M (2) can be relaxed to that of finiteness
of M (1). If M (1) is not defined then that means that the lengths of commitments
are too large and are impractical.
6.4. Large mean-set. Also, to foil the attack one can use a distribution µ on G
such that the set Eµ is large. As an example consider an authentication protocol in
[33], based on the difficulty of computing discrete discrete logarithms in groups of
prime order. The space of nonce elements in [33] is an additive group Zq acting by
exponentiations on a bigger group Z∗p. It is easy to compute length in (Zq ,+) = 〈1〉.
But, since the nonce elements r ∈ Zq are chosen uniformly, it follows that the mean-
set is the whole group Zq (the uniform measure is right-invariant) and in this case
it is impossible to detect the shift s and the mean-set attack fails. We also refer
to [32] for a modification of [33] where nonce elements are not taken modulo q and
security proof requires a boundary on the number of times the same key is used.
Now, let G be an infinite group. It is impossible to generate elements of G
uniformly, but one can try to achieve the property described below that can foil the
mean-set attack. Choose a probability measure µ on G so that the mean-set set Eµ
is large. Recall that Algorithm 4.1 can find up to one element of G minimizing the
weight function. For that it uses Algorithm 3.1 which randomly (according to some
measure ν) chooses an element of g ∈ G and then gradually changes it (descends)
to minimize its M value. This way the distribution ν on the initial choices g ∈ G
defines a distribution ν∗µ on the set of local minima of M on G. More precisely, for
g′ ∈ G,
ν∗µ(g
′) = µ{g ∈ G | Algorithm 3.1 stops with the answer g′ on input g}.
Denote by µs the shifted probability measure on G by an element s defined by
µs(g) = µ(s
−1g). If S ⊆ G is the set of local minima of the weight function
M relative to µ then the set sS is the set of local minima relative to µs. But the
distribution ν∗µs does not have to be induced from ν
∗
µ by the shift s, i.e., the equality
ν∗µs(g) = ν
∗
µ(s
−1g) does not have to hold. In fact, the distributions ν∗µ and ν
∗
µs can
“favor” unrelated subsets of S and sS respectively. That would definitely foil the
attack presented in this paper. On the other hand, if ν∗µ and ν
∗
µs are related, then
the mean-set attack can still work.
Finally, we want to mention again that probability measures on groups were not
extensively studied and there are no good probability measures known on general
groups and no general methods to construct measures satisfying the desired prop-
erties. Moreover, the problem of making distributions with large mean-sets is very
complicated because not every subset of a group G can be realized as a mean-set.
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See [27] and [26] for more details. A number of open questions arise regarding
the problems mentioned above, but dealing with them is beyond the scope of this
paper.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we used the probabilistic approach to analyze the Sibert et al.
group-based authentication protocol. We have proved that the scheme does not
meet necessary security compliances, i.e., it is not computationally zero-knowledge,
in practice. To conduct our analysis, we introduced a new computational problem
for finitely generated groups, the shift search problem, and employed probabilistic
tools discussed in [27] to deal with the problem. In particular, the concept of
the mean-set and the generalized strong law of large numbers for random group
elements with values in the vertices of the connected and locally-finite Cayley graph
of a given infinite finitely-generated group are used. The rate of success of getting
the secret key, as a solution to the shift search problem, has been proved to be
linear or exponential depending on the assumptions one is willing to make. In
addition, we have provided experimental evidence that our approach is practical
and can succeed even for braid groups. This work shows, among other things, that
generalization of classical probabilistic results to combinatorial objects can lead to
useful applications in group-based cryptography.
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